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Abstract 
What are the democracy effects of ‘decentralisation’ reforms and projects? Most developing countries 
have launched decentralisation reforms for the purpose of improving service delivery, local development 
and management. In these reforms and projects, however, governments, international development agen-
cies and large non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are transferring power to a wide range of local in-
stitutions, including private bodies, customary authorities and NGOs. Recognition of these other local 
institutions means that fledgling local governments are receiving few public powers and face competition 
for legitimacy. Under what conditions is the new plurality of approaches and local interlocutors fostering 
local democratic consolidation or resulting in fragmented forms of authority and belonging? Through 
case studies in Benin, Guatemala, India, Malawi, Russia, Senegal and South Africa, this issue explores 
the effects of institutional choices and recognition by governments, international development agencies 
and large NGOs on three dimensions of democracy: 1) representation, 2) citizenship and 3) the public 
domain. This article outlines an approach to the politics of institutional choice and recognition while 
drawing out findings from the articles in this issue. 
 
Keywords: democratic decentralisation, civil society, citizenship, local government, natural resource 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
WHEN DOES THE MIX OF INSTITUTIONS being created and 
supported in the name of decentralisation contribute to 
the formation and consolidation of democratic local gov-
ernment? The articles in this special issue examine the ef-
fects of institutional choices by central governments, 
international development agencies and large NGOs on 
three dimensions of local democracy: representation, citi-
zenship and the public domain. In some decentralisations 
elected local governments are receiving support. In most 
they are avoided in favour of a plethora of parallel insti-
tutions. Is this multiplication of local institutions and the 
cultivation of identity- and interest-based forms of inclu-
sion over residency-based citizenship fragmenting the lo-
cal arena into competing and conflicting identity and 
interest groups? Is the public domain—which we define 
as the material resources and decisions under public con-
trol—being enclosed, diminished and desecularised via 
various forms of privatisation?1 Is citizenship—the right 
and ability of people to be politically engaged and shape 
the fate of their polity—being undermined as a result of 
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these processes? This introduction and the articles in this 
special issue explore the origins and effects of the emerg-
ing local institutional mix on local democratisation.  
 Since the mid-1980s, the majority of developing coun-
tries have legislated decentralisation reforms (Crook & 
Manor 1998; World Bank 2000; Ndegwa 2002). Most 
claim that they are undergoing ‘democratic’ decentralisa-
tion (Ndegwa 2002). The stated aim of these reforms is to 
establish and democratise local government for purposes 
of democratisation itself and for improving service deliv-
ery, local development and resource management. While 
adequately justified on the basis that democracy is a good 
in itself, political and development theorists also empha-
sise the material benefits of local representation. These 
reforms—whether administrative or democratic—are be-
lieved by many theorists and practitioners to improve ef-
ficiency and equity (Mawhood 1983; Crook & Manor 
1998).2 Local decision makers are expected to be better 
able to decipher and respond to local needs because they 
are physically close to the people and are mandated to 
work on behalf of the whole local population (as in  
administrative decentralisations), or are systematically 
accountable3 to the population (as in democratic decen-
tralisations). The general logic of decentralisation is in-
clusive and public. It is predicated on proximity and 
democratic processes reducing transaction costs, produc-
ing better accountability of decision makers to the popu-
lation, enabling them to better integrate across local 
needs and to match decisions and resources to local needs 
and aspirations (Agrawal & Ribot 1999).  
 In the name of decentralisation, central governments, 
international development agencies and international 
NGOs are transferring power to local private bodies, cus-
tomary authorities and NGOs. Transfers to these bodies, 
however, are better labelled as privatisation, participatory 
or empowerment approaches, NGO and civil society sup-
port, social funds or community driven development (Ri-
bot 2003; Pritchett & Woolcock 2004). Each approach 
empowers different kinds of local institutions or authori-
ties, with potentially different democratic and distribu-
tional outcomes. Because of support for and proliferation 
of local institutional forms, fledgling democratic local 
governments often receive few public resources or pow-
ers and must compete with a plethora of new local institu-
tions (Ribot 1999; Namara & Nsabagasani 2003; Manor 
2004; Poteete 2007: 16). Democratic local government is 
rarely given the means—discretionary authority, techni-
cal support, equipment or finances—to represent or to 
engage local people in public affairs (Crook & Manor 
1998; Ribot 2003). Cases in this issue, and in the ‘Institu-
tional choice and recognition’ research programme from 
which these articles are derived,4 illustrate how local 
government has been fettered in this manner (see and 
Toni 2007; Xiaoyi 2007 and in this issue Bandiaky; Hara; 
Spierenburg et al.) as well as how government or external 
actors have successfully—even if not wholeheartedly—
promoted local representation (Ito 2007; and this issue 
Chhatre; Larson; Lankina). 
 This special issue explores the reasons behind local 
‘institutional choices’ and the effects of choosing or ‘rec-
ognising’ different kinds of local authorities on local de-
mocracy. In what are called ‘decentralisation reforms’, 
central actors are choosing powers to transfer and local 
institutions to transfer them to. These reforms may be 
motivated by internal political or public dynamics or by 
external pressures by donors or social movements. In this 
article we focus on how these choices shape local author-
ity. Institutional choice refers to the choice of the locus of 
authority. We use the term ‘choice’ to attribute agency 
and therefore, responsibility to government and interna-
tional organisations for their decisions. Governments and 
international organisations choose local authorities by 
transferring powers to them, conducting joint activities or 
soliciting their input. Through their choices, they are 
transforming the local institutional landscape. The term 
‘recognition’ (Taylor 1994) evokes the political philoso-
phy literature on identity politics and multi-culturalism.5 
We use the concept of ‘recognition’ to better understand 
these choices and to explore the effects that the chosen 
mix of local authorities have on representation, citizen-
ship and the public domain. Different forms of local au-
thority imply different development and equity outcomes. 
Understanding the link between forms of authority and 
outcomes is critical for motivating and for redesigning 
decentralisation reforms. 
 The authors in this issue were asked to examine 1) 
which kinds of local authorities are being chosen and 
why, and then to focus on 2) the effects of these choices, 
that is, the ‘effects of recognition’, on democracy and de-
velopment in their case studies. The public justifications 
for the choices are varied, including pro-poor agendas, 
virtues of civil society, superiority of community-based 
and/or indigenous systems and advantages of direct par-
ticipation. Behind the public justifications are private in-
terests such as donor pressure, fear of loss of power and 
authority, fiscal crises, maintaining privilege or cultivat-
ing political constituencies. Understanding choice helps 
to separate the public justifications from the complex of 
political and private interests driving them, potentially il-
luminating ways to influence decentralisation policy 
processes. Understanding the effects helps us to identify 
approaches most likely to foster dynamic and articulated 
local democracy.6  
 The cases in this issue focus on decentralisations in-
volving natural resources. Natural resources are a power-
ful lens on decentralisation because they are important to 
a multitude of public and private actors. They are a 
source of subsistence and income for the rural world and 
of income and wealth for central governments and na-
tional elite. Transfer of natural-resource powers from 
central to local authorities mobilises a wide range of in-
terested parties.  
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 This introduction outlines the ‘institutional choice and 
recognition’ framework (Ribot 2006) for analysing the 
prospects for a consolidation of local democracy in the 
context of decentralisation reforms. The section below 
outlines our focus on authority. The following section 
develops the basic concepts of choice and recognition 
while laying out criteria with which to examine their ef-
fects. The third section draws out the findings of the arti-
cles in the issue and is followed by a concluding 
discussion.  
 
RECOGNISING AUTHORITY 
 
Taylor’s (1994) ‘politics of recognition’ describes a set of 
tenets for redressing identity-based inequities. For Tay-
lor, recognition redresses inequities by privileging cul-
tures and identity groups that have been marginalised. 
The politics of recognition identifies marginality as a 
product of ‘misrecognition’ or prejudices against cultures 
and cultural forms. Taylor argues that misrecognised cul-
tures must be ‘recognised’—promoted, protected and 
empowered—so as to enable individual members to de-
velop a positive image of themselves and to fulfill their 
potential as individuals within the broader society. Rec-
ognition, for Taylor, is an act of enfranchisement. We ob-
serve that states and international institutions are always 
engaged in recognising new authorities around the 
world—strengthening some and weakening others. In the 
process, they are strengthening and weakening different 
forms of authority and those authorities’ reign over their 
constituent populations. This article shifts the focus from 
the recognition of culture and identities to the recognition 
of authority.7 In doing so, we are also promoting a shift 
in much of the economics, common property and devel-
opment literature from a focus on ‘property’ and ‘tenure’ 
to a focus on ‘authority’. While ‘property’ is an enforce-
able claim (MacPherson 1978), too much attention is 
trained on the rules of the game rather than the origins 
and construction of the authorities ‘enforcing’ the rules. 
We find that critiques of Taylor’s concept of recognition 
by Fraser (2000), Markell (2000), Tully (2000) and 
Povinelli (2002) shed light on the enfranchising and dis-
enfranchising effects of recognising different kinds of au-
thorities. As such, the recognition literature provides the 
conceptual tools for analysing the production of democ-
ratic local authority. 
 Recognition of representative authorities can provide 
for representation of diverse interests. Recognition of 
non-representative authorities subjects individuals to the 
cultural or ideological vagaries of those authorities. Tully 
(2000: 477) argues, struggles over recognition and distri-
bution are not ends in themselves but must be subject to 
‘democratic disagreement, dispute, negotiation, amend-
ment, implementation, review and further disagreement’. 
To remain democratic, these struggles need to be under 
democratic authority. ‘A free and democratic society will 
be legitimate even though its rules of recognition harbor 
elements of injustice and non-consensus if the citizens are 
always free to enter into processes of contestation and 
negotiation of the rules of recognition’ (Tully 2000: 477). 
But, rules are not easily contestable when chosen authori-
ties are non-democratic and the choice of those authori-
ties is imposed by inaccessible higher authorities. The 
central irony of recognising cultural authorities—chiefs, 
indigenous or ethnic leaders—in the name of freedom or 
democracy is that this recognition can constrain the very 
contestation that makes a society free and democratic. 
 Fraser (2000) argues that Taylor’s recognition of spe-
cific ‘misrecognised’ groups, ‘…insofar as it reifies 
group identities, … risks sanctioning violations of human 
rights and freezing the very antagonisms it purports to 
mediate.’ By reifying culture, Fraser (2000: 112) sug-
gests, the politics of recognition places ‘…moral pressure 
on individual members to conform to a given group cul-
ture. Cultural dissonance and experimentation are accord-
ingly discouraged, when they are not simply equated with 
disloyalty. So too is cultural criticism, including efforts to 
explore intra-group divisions, such as those of gender, 
sexuality and class’. Fraser (2000: 108–111) also argues 
that privileging culture and identity diverts attention from 
material and social bases of distribution, potentially rein-
forcing material injustices. Recognising identity and in-
terest-based authorities impose their notions of culture 
and their interest on those under their rule—similarly 
suppressing intra-group difference (see Mamdani 1996). 
Indeed, by reifying group identity, recognition obscures 
internal cultural differences and subordinates the 
‘…struggles within the group for the authority—and the 
power—to represent it’ (Fraser 2000: 112; Povinelli 
2002: 6–13).  
 These critiques are not limited to instances where cul-
ture-based injustices are redressed through strengthening 
of cultural identities or privileging of one cultural form 
over another. By focusing on the role of ‘recognition’ in 
the construction of local authority, the ‘politics of choice 
and recognition’ framework extends these critiques to 
analysis of any reforms where powers are transferred to 
local authorities. Recognition is not merely an act of ac-
knowledging an existing identity or authority; recognition 
creates or enforces that authority (Markell 2000: 496–
497), and therefore must be analysed as a political act 
with profound consequences for democracy. 
   The desire to privilege ‘misrecognised’ cultures often 
drives international development interventions. Across 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America, 
for example, ‘indigenous’, ‘customary’ and ‘traditional’ 
authorities are making a political comeback (Geschiere & 
Boone 2003; von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2003; Larson, 
this issue). This reemergence is at least partly cultivated 
from above—a result of government, donors and interna-
tional NGOs recognising the authority of chiefs and 
headmen. The reemergence of customary authority is so 
[Downloaded free from http://www.conservationandsociety.org on Monday, November 26, 2012, IP: 158.143.197.25]  ||  Click here to download free Android application
for this journal
/ Jesse C. Ribot et al 
 
4
widespread and takes so many forms that it must also be 
attributed to particular local histories reshaped by global 
changes that give new life to traditional forms of belong-
ing and identity (Engelbert 2002). Important blind spots, 
however, are evident in development approaches that fa-
vour indigeneity. First, political analysis and judgment of 
indigenous governance systems are rarely featured in the 
new approaches (a new kind of ‘anti-politics’, Ferguson 
1994). Second, custom and customary authorities are con-
flated such that customary authorities are favoured rather 
than custom itself (Moore 1986; Chanock 1991).  
 Of course, not everything indigenous is ‘good’. Many 
of the ‘indigenous’ governance systems, when analysed 
as political systems rather than being viewed as cultural 
forms, would be labelled totalitarian, despotic, oppres-
sive, patriarchal, gender biased or gerontocratic. Some 
indigenous cultures condone and continue forms of servi-
tude and slavery. But when we call them ‘indigenous’, it 
is as if suddenly the nature of authority and governance is 
obscured behind a fog of cultural relativism. Those who 
favour other cultures and indigenous peoples do not want 
to judge them. The confusion is deepened since many 
cultural or indigenous authorities are substantively de-
mocratic and do indeed work on behalf of their people 
(Spierenburg 1995; Olowu &Wunsch 2004; in this issue 
Larson; Spierenburg et al.), while elected local govern-
ments often marginalise the poor, women, indigenous 
peoples and lower castes (Crook & Manor 1998; Crook & 
Sverrisson 2001; Agrawal & Gupta 2005). Where com-
munities are already highly stratified along the lines of 
power, income, wealth and social status, recognising lo-
cal governments can have the effect of ‘obscuring inter-
nal differences’ within the village, thereby further 
marginalising lower castes (Agrawal & Gupta 2005). 
 Clearly, authority should not be legitimised just be-
cause it is labelled ‘democratic’, ‘customary’ or ‘indige-
nous’, nor should authority over the public domain be 
transferred uncritically to NGOs or private bodies. While 
elected local government is often scrutinised, the terms 
‘culture’, ‘private’ or ‘NGO’ should not provide protec-
tion from political analysis—even if these authorities are 
locally ‘legitimate’ or considered ‘authentic’ (see Ntsebeza 
2004). To avoid double standards, cultural and political 
authorities as well as community and private leaders 
should be viewed in the same critical light. This critical 
equity provides a starting point for a dialogue among cul-
tural and political stances. All local authorities need to be 
evaluated for how they represent people, encourage citi-
zenship and produce an engaging public domain.  
 
THE POLITICS OF CHOICE AND RECOGNITION 
 
This section outlines an analytic framework for evaluat-
ing the enfranchising potential of forms of local author-
ity. The articles in this issue begin to explore the 
elements of this framework.  
The Politics of Choice: Policy Processes in the  
Establishment of Local Authorities 
 
Decentralisations can provide the infrastructure for popu-
lar engagement and expression (Ribot 2003; Heller et al. 
2007: 628). They can open spaces for new kinds of local 
agency to initiate active citizen engagement (Gaventa 
2002; Eckert 2006). But, as with any policy reform, de-
centralisations are ‘top-down’ affairs—designed and im-
plemented by central actors. How do these central policy 
makers and development professionals choose local insti-
tutions in democratic decentralisation or local develop-
ment interventions? Do their institutional choices reflect 
or graft onto the aggregate aspirations of individuals 
maximising their own good (a la Ostrom 1990)? Do they 
select authorities and institutions to meet their own  
narrow economic and political interests (Bates 1981; Frye 
1997)? Do local institutions choose themselves and im-
pose themselves on emerging opportunities and decision-
making processes (Gaventa 2002; Boone 2003; Eckert 
2006; von Benda Beckmann & von Benda-Beckmann 
2006)? Clearly all of these processes are in play. Articles 
in this issue by Chhatre and Hara address the politics of 
choice (also see Ito 2007; Toni 2007). They describe  
how policies and decisions of higher level authorities, 
with or without influence of local citizens, result in the 
creation, selection or appointment of specific authorities 
and/or enable local actors to engage or capture new oppor-
tunities.  
 Institutions—whether rules or authorities—are not 
merely organically emerging solutions to collective ac-
tion problems. Rather, they are created or cultivated by 
powerful interests. We start with Bates’ (1981) notion of 
‘institutional choice’ to bring attention to the motives and 
actions of the central authorities crafting decentralisa-
tions, and, in the process, shaping the local institutional 
landscape. Complementing this concept with Taylor’s 
‘politics of recognition’ brings in the struggle of social 
actors to redress historical wrongs that force the state to 
‘recognise’ marginalised groups. Combining choice and 
recognition enables an integration of both choices from 
above and pressure from below in understanding institu-
tional choices, while the critique of recognition helps to 
illuminate potential effects of these choices.  
 
The Effects of Recognition 
 
Governments and international organisations usually em-
phasise development and environmental outcomes when 
promoting decentralisation, and most also give high bill-
ing to participation and democracy outcomes. But, the re-
sults of their institutional choices on development, the 
environment or on the emergence and consolidation of 
local democracy often differ from stated objectives or ex-
pected outcomes.8 The articles in this issue focus on de-
mocracy effects of institutional choice. Is the mix of 
[Downloaded free from http://www.conservationandsociety.org on Monday, November 26, 2012, IP: 158.143.197.25]  ||  Click here to download free Android application
for this journal
Institutional choice and recognition in the formation and consolidation of local democracy / 5
recognised institutions helping to establish, strengthen or 
consolidate local democracy? 
 The ‘politics of choice and recognition’ framework ex-
tends the discussion of ‘recognition’ to institutions. Like 
the recognition of culture or individuals, the recognition 
of local institutions or authorities confers power and le-
gitimacy, and cultivates identities and forms of belong-
ing. The choice of local authorities or organisations by 
government or international agencies is a form of recog-
nition. Following Markell (2000: 496) ‘‘recognition’ is 
something used to refer not to the successful cognition of 
an already-existing thing, but to the constructive act 
through which recognition’s very object is shaped or 
brought into being’. This recognition takes place through 
the transfer of powers, partnering in projects, engagement 
through contracts or via participation in dialogue and de-
cision-making. Recognition strengthens the chosen au-
thorities and organisations with resources and backing, 
reinforcing the forms of belonging these local institutions 
engender and the identities of their members. In doing so, 
recognition shapes three key aspects of democracy dis-
cussed below: representation, citizenship and public do-
main.  
 
Representation 
 
In recent decades many institutions have been created or 
cultivated with the purpose of increasing popular partici-
pation and empowerment in planning and decision-
making (Fung 2003; Fung & Wright 2003).9 While in-
creased participation may have democratic characteristics 
by bringing a broader cross-section of the population into 
decision-making, participatory processes are often neither 
representative nor binding (Mosse 2001). Following 
Manin et al. (1999), democratic representation occurs 
when leaders are both responsive and accountable to the 
people. Accountability is achieved through positive and 
negative sanctions, and is a defining characteristic of de-
mocracy. Responsiveness requires leaders with powers—
the discretionary power to translate needs and aspirations 
into policy and policy into practice (Ribot 2003; Pritchett 
& Woolcock 2004). So, to be democratic, institutions 
must be representative: accountable to the people and 
empowered to respond. 
 In decentralisation and other local development inter-
ventions, outside authorities choose to work with, and 
therefore recognise, local authorities. In doing so, they 
cultivate these authorities, strengthening and legitimating 
them. But, how representative are the chosen institutions? 
In current decentralisations—even those called ‘democ-
ratic’—governments and international donors are largely 
choosing to avoid elected local government in favour of 
other institutions (Romeo 1996; Agrawal & Ribot 1999; 
Manor 2004; Toni 2007; see articles in this issue by Hara; 
Bandiaky; for exceptions, see Lankina & Getachew 2006; 
Lankina, this issue). This choice is critical in that it de-
prives local elected authorities of the powers transferred 
to the local arena while empowering alternative or so-
called ‘parallel’ authorities. Empowering local line minis-
try offices, NGOs, customary chiefs, and private corpora-
tions can de-legitimate elected local authorities while 
legitimating parallel bodies. Elected local government is 
forced to compete and struggle with other local institu-
tions for the legitimacy that follows from control of pub-
lic decisions and service delivery.  
 Representative local authorities can be strengthened 
through recognition (Lankina, this issue). They may be 
weakened, however, 1) if they receive too little power to 
be effective (Toni 2007; in this issue see Bandiaky; Hara; 
Larson; Spierenburg et al.), or 2) if parallel institutions 
overshadow or pre-empt their ability to serve public in-
terest (by Toni 2007; as described in this issue by Hara; 
Bandiaky). Manor (2004) describes democracy effects of 
under-funded local governments with a mandate to man-
age natural resources operating in an arena with over-
funded environment committees. Transferring public 
powers to parallel authorities in the local arena can take 
powers away from, and produce competition with, de-
mocratic local government. Competition can be divisive 
(see Toni 2007) or it may lead to more efficiency and bet-
ter representation all around (Ito 2007; see Chhatre, this 
issue). It can undermine the legitimacy of local democ-
ratic authorities while producing conditions for elite cap-
ture, or it may produce a pluralism of competition and 
cooperation that helps establish and thicken civil society 
and articulation between society and government (Chha-
tre; Lankina, this issue).10 
 
Citizenship 
 
Recognition of different kinds of authorities and organi-
sations entails different forms of belonging (Toni 2007; 
see in this issue Lankina; Larson; Bandiaky). Under de-
mocratic authorities, belonging is inclusive of those who 
reside in a jurisdiction: residency-based citizenship. In 
liberal democracies, citizenship is usually associated with 
entitlement to certain civil, social and political rights irre-
spective of one’s identity and interests (Sparke 2004). 
But, ‘rather than merely focusing on citizenship as legal 
rights,’ Isin and Turner (2002: 4) argue that ‘there is now 
agreement that citizenship must also be defined as a so-
cial process through which individual and social groups 
engaged in claiming, expanding or losing rights.’ Citizen-
ship has come to be a process of being politically en-
gaged and of shaping the fate of the polity in which one 
is involved (Isin & Turner 2002).  
 Power transfers authorise. Empowering an authority 
gives it a role and resources, making it worth engaging, 
giving people a reason to belong and exert influence. Au-
thorities that are open to influence foster citizenship, 
while those that impose their will are less inviting of en-
gagement.11 Different authorities also authorise different 
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forms of belonging. Residency-based citizenship is inclu-
sive and democratic authorities are ostensibly more open 
to influence by the population. In private groups and 
NGOs, belonging is more narrow, based on interest—
often class or objective driven. Membership can also be 
based on identity, such as professional or any other entry 
criteria the members establish. In customary and religious 
institutions, membership is often based on identity—such 
as ethnicity, place of origin, language or religion. Self-
appointed or hereditary private and customary leaders 
may be less systematically accountable to their members.  
 Different kinds of authorities confer different rights 
and recourse; they are accountable to the population to 
different degrees. Under some authorities people are citi-
zens—with rights and recourse—under others they are 
reduced to subjects (Mamdani 1996). Citizenship 
emerges where there are empowered and downwardly ac-
countable authorities—worth engaging and open to en-
gagement. Choosing the locus of authority establishes, 
strengthens or weakens citizenship. Where public re-
sources are channelled into private bodies or autocratic 
authorities, the scope for citizen engagement is dimin-
ished.  
 
Public Domain 
 
Without powers, no authorities are worth influencing—
even if they are accountable. A ‘domain’ is that which is 
dominated by an authority. The public domain consists of 
the powers (resources and decisions) held, or citizen 
rights defended by, a public authority. It is the set of po-
litical powers vis-à-vis which citizens are able and enti-
tled to influence public authorities. Retaining powers in 
the public domain maintains and reinforces public be-
longing in, and citizen identification with, the public au-
thorities and with other citizens in the polity. Conversely, 
privatising public resources and powers to individuals, 
corporations, customary authorities or NGOs diminishes 
the public domain. Such enclosure shrinks the integrative 
space of democratic public interaction. Without public 
powers there is no space of democracy—there is no ‘pub-
lic domain’ for citizens to engage in. 
 In decentralisations, the choice to allocate public pow-
ers among multiple interest and identity groups may en-
close the public domain and fragment society into 
interest- and identity-based forms of belonging. The pri-
vatisation of public powers to NGOs and other private 
bodies is a form of enclosure. When actors receiving 
these powers are customary or religious authorities, this 
enclosure constitutes a de-secularisation of powers. These 
acts diminish the domain of integrative public action, un-
dermining residency-based belonging and citizenship. A 
public domain is a necessary part of representation and of 
the production of citizenship. It is the space of integrative 
collective action that constitutes democracy. For decen-
tralisations to produce benefits in equity, efficiency and 
democratisation, retaining substantial public powers in 
the public domain is essential. 
 
THE ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE 
 
The institutional choice and recognition framework was 
used by a groups of researchers in World Resources Insti-
tute’s comparative research programme, ‘Institutional 
choice and recognition in natural resource decentralisa-
tion’, to interrogate the democracy effects of recognition 
of local institutions and authorities (elected local gov-
ernment, pluralism, privatisation, NGOism, support for 
customary chiefs). By examining the effects of choosing 
these different institutional arrangements in decentralisa-
tions, researchers can examine the propositions that: 1) 
the support given to local authorities privileges and 
strengthens them, whether their constituencies are resi-
dency-, identity- or interest-based, and 2) when govern-
ments and international agencies empower local 
authorities, they are enforcing upon the members of the 
groups the particular forms of comportment, accountabil-
ity relations, belonging and beliefs of the chosen authori-
ties. The articles from the research programme that are 
published in this issue are described here.  
 Ashwini Chhatre’s article (this issue) details the proc-
ess of democratic consolidation in Himachal Pradesh, In-
dia. Here, legislators chose panchayats as local 
interlocutors because local people opted to use them as a 
channel of influence. Local people chose panchayats due 
to their political connections and their emerging powers 
under decentralisation reforms. Chhatre describes this po-
litical ‘virtuous circle’ linking people to panchayats and 
panchayats to legislators as ‘political articulation.’  He 
defines ‘an articulated democratic system’ as one that 
will enable local people to influence political authorities. 
In a disarticulated political system elected representatives 
are alienated from their constituents and lack incentive or 
ability to respond to demands from below. The key to 
Himachal Pradesh’s local government success was the 
‘space and opportunity for community engagement’ gen-
erated by accountability. Chhatre’s articulation approach 
enables a dynamic multi-layered analysis of emerging lo-
cal democracy in which power and accountability are re-
lational and not located in a single authority. Here higher 
level competition explains how the choices by higher 
level political authorities helped make lower level au-
thorities locally accountable (Schumpeter 1943). Recog-
nition of the panchayat by political parties and via 
decentralisation explains their consolidation as a local po-
litical force and locus of engagement.  
 Tomila Lankina (this issue) shows that promotion of a 
local sense of citizenship, belonging and representation 
transcends the national state. Karelia, a region on the 
Finnish border of Russia boasts relatively autonomous 
local government compared to other Russian regions. 
Western involvement accounts for Karelia’s post-
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communist institutional development: the European Un-
ion (EU) works with local governments while also urging 
their cooperation with NGOs. In the 1990s, Karelia 
adopted the Nordic neighbours’ local government mod-
els. In 2003 the federal government, however, embarked 
on recentralisation, including in forestry management, us-
ing the pro-Kremlin regional governor as an ally in un-
dermining local government autonomy. Lankina suggests 
that local citizens and authorities resist being hemmed in 
by seeking to emulate Nordic and EU practices across the 
border. By working with local government and by provid-
ing an alternative vision of local democracy, external do-
nors in Karelia inspire citizen engagement and struggles 
for democratic local government. The sense of discrep-
ancy between what people see at home and abroad fosters 
a productive kind of ‘fragmented belonging’ that moti-
vates people to emulate their western neighbours. 
Lankina shows that this fragmentation translates into lo-
cal institutional choices. The regional capital city coun-
cillors have successfully resisted the Kremlin’s local 
government reforms. They attempt to expand citizenship 
and belonging in their polity by making appeals to de-
mocratic norms and the authority of the EU and the 
Council of Europe. The result is local governments that 
are more representative and downwardly accountable 
than in many other Russian regions.  
 Anne Larson (this issue) argues that poor and excluded 
indigenous people ‘need organisations and collective ac-
tion, allies, interlocutors and sympathetic, or at least 
open, government officials’ if they are to be heard. In 
Guatemala, a long history of integrationist policies has 
shaped indigenous people’s healthy mistrust of govern-
ment and consequently their ability to take advantage of 
new local government institutions. While the government 
of Guatemala has chosen to work through local govern-
ment, many local people have chosen to exercise agency 
through a mix of parallel institutions and individuals—in 
one of her cases through their indigenous leaders. These 
leaders helped translate local concerns into policy by  
defending indigenous people’s rights to be included in 
political decisions. Larson shows that empowering in-
digenous leaders can enable communities to influence 
public policies in their favour, bringing into question 
whether liberal democracy is the only means for people to 
achieve representation. The empowerment of customary 
chiefs with discretionary authority over public decisions 
carries the risk, flagged by Mamdani (1996), of encapsu-
lating individuals in a customary system they cannot in-
fluence—e.g. indigenous chiefs—depriving them of 
rights while diminishing the public domain for those who 
are not indigenous. Larson confronts this conundrum of 
liberal democracy showing that justice may still be better 
served for the most marginalised populations when in-
digenous leaders can speak and negotiate for their con-
stituents. Larson suggests that local democracy can be 
supported through state created spaces for contestation in 
which indigenous authorities can play a ‘representative’ 
role.  
 Roch Mongbo (this issue) compares the disengagement 
of elected local government in the forests of Toui-Kilibo 
and Lokoly in Benin. In Toui-Kilibo the forest service, 
under a ‘participatory’ forestry project, chose to set up 
forest management committees—pushing elected local 
government to the sidelines (Manor 2004; see Bandiaky, 
this issue). These elected local committees carry out pro-
ject-determined activities, acting as local administrative 
branches of the central state. The committees imple-
mented activities against the interests of local people. 
When the local government tried to intervene, the project 
committee members depicted them as agitators and the 
local government was intimidated into remaining mar-
ginal. By contrast, Lokoly forest is regulated by a cus-
tomary chief and priest. The local government has limited 
knowledge of its own stakes in the forest or its manage-
ment and takes no action to intervene. The head of the 
Arrondissement, the next higher level of government, 
tried to assert authority over the forests by calling a meet-
ing between the population and environmental NGOs. 
The NGOs suggested tourism as a viable activity, dis-
couraging other income-generating forest activities in fa-
vour of conservation. Villagers and customary authorities 
asked for infrastructure to help them market forest prod-
ucts. Seeing conflict, the local government was too timid 
to engage. In Benin, as in Senegal (Bandiaky, this issue), 
the local public domain is diminished by the failure of lo-
cal elected governments to exercise their legal powers.  
 Solange Bandiaky (this issue) shows how donors’ and 
Forest Service’s ostensibly ‘gender-neutral’ institutional 
choices deepen existing gender, class, political and ethnic 
hierarchies in the World Bank-funded Malidino Biodiver-
sity Community-based Reserve project in Senegal. De-
centralisation and forestry laws in Senegal give elected 
local government (Rural Councils) the right to manage 
natural resources. The project, however, circumvented the 
Rural Councils, creating ‘village committees’ led by vil-
lage chiefs, imams and village elite ‘wise men’ to manage 
the reserve. The project addressed gender by assigning 
elite women to administrative committee positions, such 
as treasurer, and by giving fictitious ‘paper’ positions to 
elite family women. In turn, these elite women allocated 
project positions and resources to women in their families 
and ethnic groups. Male committee leaders, mostly from 
the ruling Socialist Party (PS), excluded opposition party 
members from reserve benefits. The Forest Service ap-
pointed an elected PS rural councillor as reserve president 
who allocated project food assistance to his extended kin 
and PS members. The reserve presidency allowed a pri-
vate individual to use public powers to further his politi-
cal agenda (Bates 1981). The project enclosed the reserve 
from the larger citizenry in the service of one political 
party and associated families. Bandiaky shows that by 
failing to confront underlying power relations, ostensibly 
[Downloaded free from http://www.conservationandsociety.org on Monday, November 26, 2012, IP: 158.143.197.25]  ||  Click here to download free Android application
for this journal
/ Jesse C. Ribot et al 
 
8
gender sensitive arrangements continued to reinforce 
gender hierarchies. She also shows how women are 
‘dragged into male political rivalries’, dividing women 
along these same political lines and fragmenting gender 
solidarity.  
 In Mangochi district, Malawi, Mafaniso Hara (this is-
sue) shows how the Parliament, the Fisheries Department 
and the international donors structured two levels of local 
institutions to represent local people in fisheries man-
agement: Beach Village Committees (BVCs) and District 
Assemblies (DAs). Headmen in the villages traditionally 
played a mediating role in fisheries decisions. The Fisher-
ies Department with donor support, however, opted for 
elected committees representing the whole population of 
each fishing village in order to balance the vested inter-
ests of fishers. Subsequent to the creation of the BVCs, 
Malawi’s decentralisation laws created DAs with the 
power to manage fisheries. The new laws would transfer 
supervision over the BVCs from the Fisheries Depart-
ment to the DAs. However, this shift was prevented by 
concerted opposition from members of Parliament, 
threatened by the creation of DAs. Conflict of interest 
and mistrust shaped choices by the Fisheries Department, 
donors and the Parliament. The Fisheries Department did 
not trust the BVCs enough to give them significant pow-
ers. Central government had no interest in empowering 
the DAs enough to allow sectoral committees—fisheries 
in this case—to be transferred out of centrally controlled 
line ministries. Parliament had no interest in allowing 
DAs to even come into being. Donors did not trust local 
communities enough to allow their elected representa-
tives to control the BVCs. The result was a weak BVC 
functioning outside of the legal framework of a decen-
tralisation that never took place.  
 In 1969 the Makuleke people were evicted from South 
Africa’s Kruger National Park. Marja Spierenburg, Con-
rad Steenkamp and Harry Wels (this issue) describe how, 
in the 1990s, the Makuleke used existing law to reclaim 
their land from the South African National Parks author-
ity (SANParks). To reduce tensions between the Makuleke 
and SANParks, Germany’s international development 
agency (GtZ) introduced a multi-stakeholder platform so 
the Makuleke could bargain with SANParks. But the 
South Africa Land Claims Commission rejected the 
stakeholder approach and introduced an advocacy-based 
approach emphasising the differences in interests be-
tween the Makuleke and SANParks. In lieu of ‘negotiat-
ing a compromise’, the commission helped the Makuleke 
articulate and defend their position. The Makuleke chose 
the Land Commission’s adversarial approach and bro-
kered a solution with SANParks. The Makuleke estab-
lished a Communal Property Association (CPA) to 
collectively manage their land, including the entire Ma-
kuleke community and an elected leadership. They 
elected their traditional chief as chairperson. SANParks, 
however, attenuated the Makuleke’s gains with long term 
use restrictions. In addition, the CPA signed a 99 year 
lease with a private hunting concession, further restrict-
ing their land use options in exchange for a potential fu-
ture benefit stream. In this process, a global commons 
shifted from an ostensibly national South African public 
under the control of SANParks to the control and man-
agement of a private communal land association (the 
CPA) that represents a local identity-based, and perhaps 
residency-based, public (the Makuleke), to a private firm. 
As control over resources and lucrative opportunities 
changed hands, the public domain was simultaneously 
expanded and shrunken at different scales.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The governments of India, Brazil, Indonesia, Russia, 
Guatemala, Benin, Senegal, Malawi and South Africa 
have launched processes ostensibly designed to enable 
local people to govern their own affairs. In all of the case 
under study, central government, donors or development 
professionals proclaimed a belief in democratic local 
government. This belief seems to have driven choices in 
India, Indonesia, Russia and Guatemala. In Brazil, Gua-
temala and Malawi mistrust of local government, how-
ever, compelled politicians, government agencies and 
donors to choose alternative local authorities. Mobilisa-
tion of a union social movement in Brazil and an indige-
nous social movement in Guatemala, instrumental 
management objectives in Malawi, Benin and Senegal, 
belief in civil society in Brazil, Indonesia and Senegal, 
and a line ministry’s support for group rights in South 
Africa drove the choice toward parallel local authorities. 
The outcomes of these choices were mixed. Recognition 
of local government in India, Indonesia, Russia and Gua-
temala helped local governments to become relevant and 
more representative. In Brazil, Malawi, Benin and Sene-
gal, the circumvention of elected local government chan-
nelled resources into ‘deconcentrated’ project committees 
and other private ‘civil society’ organisations. In South 
Africa, recognition of collective private rights produced a 
democratically chosen ethnic leader. 
 The empowerment of local government in India and 
Indonesia illustrates how democratic competition shapes 
the political articulation of citizens with the state (Ito 
2007; see Chhatre, this issue). While in India citizen en-
gagement is broad-based, in Indonesia engagement is be-
tween the state and narrow elite. This narrow engagement 
followed from a selective civil society approach to local 
democracy in which policy makers choose or cultivate an 
elite state allied civil society. While the Indonesia case 
shows the limits of a ‘civil society’ approach to local de-
mocracy and development,12 increasing competition to in-
fluence decentralised public office could, over time, 
generate incentives for elite to expand social inclusion, 
providing opportunities to poor villagers to influence pol-
icy (Ito 2007). As Chhatre (this issue) argues, competi-
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tive elections at multiple levels over time and several 
electoral cycles are needed for articulation to trickle 
down to the most marginalised sections of society. Lan-
kina (this issue) also shows how the struggle for local 
power in Russia has engaged deputies with the population 
in a more articulated political struggle. The governor, 
aligned with the Kremlin, is at odds with municipal depu-
ties who are actively cultivating a local citizenry and ap-
pealing to European donors and governance standards as 
part of their struggle to consolidate their locality’s politi-
cal power and autonomy.  
 The selective civil society approach was also used in 
project implementation by the Forestry and Fisheries De-
partments in Senegal, Malawi and Benin where projects 
produced ‘civil society’ committees composed of hand-
picked local actors allied with project objectives. In these 
and the Indonesia case, civil society approaches are used 
to selectively empower class, party, ethnic and gendered 
allies, reproducing and entrenching existing social strati-
fication. This civil society approach is not enabling all 
groups within society to influence governance on an 
equal basis. In Brazil, however, the state chose an argua-
bly pro-poor local union movement as its institutional 
ally and in Guatemala the self-selected indigenous lead-
ers did effectively protect the interests of their marginal-
ised population. Where civil society emerged from social 
movements, it appears that a civil society approach was 
effective at broad-based representation and serving inter-
ests of the poor. Similarly, in the India case, a locally 
constituted social movement against a forestry project ar-
ticulated broad-based representation through local gov-
ernment: the panchayat.  
 Democratic deepening is shaped by the way ‘unequal 
social relations and uneven institutional environments 
impinge upon the exercise of citizenship’ (Heller et al. 
2007: 627). In most of the case studies, transferred pow-
ers—whether discretionary or merely the implementation 
of mandates—follow the contours of existing divisions 
and inequalities shaping national and local politics. The 
powers took on the contours of a balanced political com-
petition in Himachal Pradesh, India. They divided along 
party lines in Para, Brazil.13 They articulated via class di-
visions in Bandung, Indonesia. They fractured along in-
digenous and settler-integrationist lines in Guatemala. 
Where few discretionary powers are transferred, as in 
Benin and Senegal, project funds and interventions still 
flow along lines of traditional ethnic and gender hierar-
chies. Agrawal and Gupta (2005) argue that decentralisa-
tion can exacerbate existing socio-economic inequality 
unless decentralisation programmes are specifically bi-
ased towards disadvantaged groups, rather than being 
formally neutral in their design and implementation. 
Bandiaky (this issue) also shows that gender biases are 
not addressed by gender neutral projects and argues for 
skewing recognition toward women and other marginal-
ised groups.  
 The cases show that distributive aspects of recognition 
are not solely local. Mechanisms are needed to ensure 
that marginal populations can engage in their own gov-
ernance. Local and central government play roles in as-
suring both inclusion and empowerment of marginal 
groups. In the Indonesia case the choice of elite civil so-
ciety is biasing distribution by channelling investments 
toward elite interests. In Guatemala and South Africa, 
however, it appears that marginal populations are being 
served by their own local institutions, while in South Af-
rica that success came with the support of the central 
government’s land commission. When does local author-
ity or local democracy serve the poor? Are Crook and 
Sverrisson (2001) right that local democracy does not 
serve the poor without central mandate to do so? How 
significant is Foster and Rosenzweig’s (2004) research 
showing that democratic local governments in India are 
more pro-poor than autocratic local authorities or Heller 
et al.’s (2007) findings that all categories of respon-
dents—including farmers, unions, scheduled castes and 
women—found improved service delivery following de-
mocratic decentralisation reforms? Clearly, democratic 
decentralisation can serve the poor, but targeting women, 
lower castes and under-privileged groups with focused at-
tention on biased hierarchy is probably a needed com-
plement to any local authority if local democracy is to 
redress entrenched inequity (Mansuri & Rao 2003: 11–
14; Heller et al. 2007: 629). 
 More than progressive targeting of the poor, of women 
and of marginalised castes and ethnicities are required. 
Criteria are needed to judge the likely human rights and 
material equity effects of choosing particular authorities. 
Fraser (2000: 115) does so by proposing the ideal of ‘par-
ticipatory parity’, by which all citizens and citizen 
groups, regardless of identity, must have equal opportu-
nity to participate in democratic institutions. In the insti-
tutions chosen by governments and international 
organisations, inclusive parity is not always evident. 
Chosen authorities are enabled to recognise other actors 
as authentic, or to discipline those they consider inau-
thentic. They are able to determine who belongs and who 
does not. In the cases we have explored, chosen actors are 
shaping who belongs and benefits—they are choosing by 
gender, migrant status, indigenousness, ethnicity and by 
interest. Recognition is enabling cultural and non-cultural 
authorities who can in turn shape the boundaries of inclu-
sion and determine what resources and decisions are 
made by a broad public and which are to serve individual 
and collective private ends. To produce and maintain the 
‘opportunity’ for equal inclusion will require built-in bias 
in favour of poor and marginal groups. 
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Notes 
1. In contrast to Habermas’s (1991) focus on discursive domain of 
public interaction, we emphasise the material basis of authority, 
that is, the powers (resources and domains of decision-making) 
over which citizens can interact and attempt to influence public 
decisions. 
2. For counter arguments see (Lankina 2004; Rubin 2005; Treisman 
2007).  
3. Accountability is counter power (Agrawal & Ribot 1999) or the 
ability to sanction (Manin et al. 1999).  
4. The articles in this issue are from the World Resources Institute 
research programme entitled ‘Institutional choice and recognition: 
Effects on the formation and consolidation of local democracy’. 
Not all of the articles in this programme are published in this issue 
due to their lack of sufficient conservation content for Conservation 
and Society. See (http://governance .wri.org/project_description2. 
cfm?ProjectID=44) for other articles. Accessed My 2008. 
5. Also see Kymlicka (2002) and Fraser (2000). 
6. On political articulation, see Chhatre, this issue. 
7. Including instances where the authorities being recognised are 
created by those recognising them.  
8. Despite the extreme difficulty in establishing links between insti-
tutional arrangements and development or ecological outcomes,  
a body of data is emerging (World Bank 2000; Conyers 2002; 
Mansuri & Rao 2003; Foster & Rosenzweig 2004; Heller et al. 
2007). 
9. Fung (2003) writes, however, on participation of civil society and 
of people within civil society in processes of decision-making. He 
does not, however, seem to view representative forms of govern-
ment as sufficient or even necessary to the democratic processes. 
10. This is not to deny the importance of competition between public 
and private agencies, or local governments, for efficient provision 
of public services (see Lankina et al. 2008).  
11. Engagement does not have to be invited. Resistance is also a form 
of engagement that is used to confront imposed authority. 
12. Ito (2007) shows that in Java, Indonesia, powers and resources are 
transferred to popularly elected district (bupati) governments. The 
bupati, however, chose to collaborate with ‘interest groups of vil-
lage elites’—usually organised around village heads. This new se-
lective elite-based civil society approach to decentralisation gave 
village heads significant influence and it is systematically exclud-
ing marginal populations from ‘democratic’ decision-making since 
the bupati systematically chose to partner with local rural elite as-
sociations tethered to the state in a web of patronage. The align-
ment of district government with village elite associations—whose 
interests are antagonistic to those of the poor—is hemming in the 
public domain by effectively reserving public decisions for village 
heads and the narrow elite they belong to. 
13. Toni (2007) shows how in Para, Brazil, the national ruling party, 
local government authorities, and donors marginalise elected local 
government. Brazil’s ruling party is supported by a union-based 
social movement while local government authorities are domi-
nated by an opposition party. Central government and donors 
funded the union movement while sidelining even the few elected 
pro-poor ruling-party mayors or councillors due to the political 
history and a general mistrust of local governments.   
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